

The Struggle of the Commons

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A fundamental question

- How to balance the particular behavior of **the individual** ...
- ... with the optimal outcome of **the group**?


ON
THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES


BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION,

OR THE
PRESERVATION OF FAVOURED RACES IN THE STRUGGLE
FOR LIFE.

By CHARLES DARWIN, M.A.,

FELLOW OF THE ROYAL, GEOLOGICAL, LINNEAN, ETC., SOCIETIES;
AUTHOR OF 'JOURNAL OF RESEARCHES DURING H. M. S. BEAGLE'S VOYAGE
ROUND THE WORLD.'







The public goods dilemma (PGD)

- imagine a situation in which individuals contribute to a public good (or make use of a public good resource)
- The Tragedy of the commons (found in every **major transition** in Evolution): **the optimal behavior of the individual does not correspond to that of the group**
- every-day examples: CO₂ pollution, tropical deforestation, climate change, ...

PGD are also found in bacteria




one individual bacterium might not
'feel' to cooperate: the 'cheater'





- **cheaters** benefit from the PG but pay no cost!

let's get more specific

JS Chuang et al Science 323,272(2009)




let's get more specific



+ antibiotic!


- producer growth is **density dependent** (bigger dilution --> less bacteria --> less PG)
- AUTOinducer is **limiting**

let's get more specific




- producer grow faster than non-producers (cheaters); starting from same initial density

non-producers win in any mixture of non-producers and producers



... but total proportion of producers grows overall !·\$%·!??



consider a simple model

- population of n individuals



- **producers** generate PG with efficiency r at cost c

consider a simple model

- $W_P = W_0 + rc (np - 1)/(n-1) - c$
- $W_{nP} = W_0 + rcnp/(n-1)$

Some numbers $n = 100, p = 1/2, W_0 = 10, r = 5, c = 1$

$$W_P = 11.47 > W_0$$


$$W_{nP} = 12.53 > W_0$$

Offspring $n' = n [p W_P + (1-p) W_{nP}] = 1200$

$$p' = npW_P/n' = 0.478$$

DECLINE OF PRODUCERS!


but say we have two groups



	Group 1	Group 2
n	100	100
p	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.8</u>
W_A	$10 - 1 + 5(19)/99 = 9.96$	$10 - 1 + 5(79)/99 = 12.99$
W_S	$10 + 5(20)/99 = 11.01$	$10 + 5(80)/99 = 14.04$
n'	1080	1320
p'	<u>0.184</u>	<u>0.787</u>
<i>Global population</i>		
N	$100 + 100 = 200$	
P	$[0.2(100) + 0.8(100)]/200 = $ <u>0.5</u>	
N'	$1080 + 1320 = 2400$	
P'	$[0.184(1080) + 0.787(1320)]/2400 = $ <u>0.516</u>	

 **SIMPSON'S paradox**

it's all about 1) structure, 2) variance and 3) differential contribution



Designing




sustainable

communities





imagine that PG is critical for growth
of a structured population





M Cavaliere & JF Poyatos (2012)

👁 **cheaters** can lead to extinctions ... sometimes


Simpson's paradox helps solving the threat of cheaters




Simpson's paradox helps solving the threat of cheaters ... not always!




Frequency of extinctions depend on efficiency r



Frequency of extinctions depend on efficiency r





👁 low r



👁 high r


Plasticity leads to sustainability



social threshold


Be a producer when most members
are also producers

Positive PLASTICITY




Be a producer when most members are also producers

Positive PLASTICITY



Be a producer when there is an excess of non-producers

• Negative PLASTICITY



- **Positive PLASTICITY**
- small groups,
- small efficiency
- very reactive response

- **Negative PLASTICITY**
- big groups,
- high efficiency
- minimal diversity

